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I. Introduction 
Finances were always a problem when newly arrived immigrants without credit tried to 
establish themselves in business. It was an exceptional case when immigrants, including 
Japanese, brought sufficient money to start a business in the new land. Most had to build 
up capital by themselves, while they also looked to several outside sources of financing. It 
is not always clear bow early immigrants五nancedtheir business ventures in America. 
Problems th註teach immigrant group faced and the ways they used to solve五nancialdif-
ficulties varied from oηe group to another. The importance of ethnic financing systems in 
urban small business was pointed out by Light in his study of the ethnic enterprises of the 
Japanese, Chinese and blacks, while his hypothesis has received subsequent attention.1> 
Hovvever，日nancialproblems among Japanese immigrants and their solutions in this foreign 
land are yet to be scrutinized. The present paper is a preliminary inquiry into such aspect 
of immigrants’society prior to ＼ヘrorld ＼へrar I and during the reconstruction period thereafter. 
Lack of financial machinery posed one of the fundamental problems for Japanese in 
their establishment of an economic base in the United States. It was one of the major 
concerns of those who sought to move up from laborer status to initiate their own venture, 
both in the rural and urban sectors. This concern was explicitly expressed in various 
occasions. Forty年sixconcerned Japanese agriculturists from such northern California agri-
cultural districts as Lodi, Fresno, Sacramento, Stockton and Livingston gathered together in 
Stockton in early 1909. While it was meant to promote an opportunity for the exchange 
of ideas and the circulation of information on agriculture, insufficiency of credit and the 
financial machinery to provide it to aspiring Japanese was among the issues most seriously 
discussed. One participant considered the establishment of such五nancialmachinery as the 
single most important need for Japanese agricultural development, citing the example of the 
asparagus industry in which lack of credit forced Japanese to remain share croppers. Another 
participant recommended that the Japanese establish small-scale credit unions based on per-
sonal credit, in ¥,vhich even persons without asset could have access to loans. 2> At almost 
the same time a“日ve-centsavings association" was proposed in a Los Angeles’Japanese 
newspaper, Raf u Slum戸o. If each person saved five ceロtsdaily, enough to buy a glass of 
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beer or soda, the 20,000 Japanese in southern California could accumulate some 360,000 
dollars in a year. It was argued that in this way Japanese communities could establish a 
substantial bank by themselves. 3〕 European自nancialinstitutions of "people’s banks”were 
suggested as providing a possible guideline for such developments in the Japanese com-
rnunity.。
Successful economic activities did not necessarily lead to the accumulation of working 
capital in the Japanese communities. A high proportion of their earnings ¥Vere sent back 
to Japan, although remittances to the homeland were not peculiar to the Japanese. Before 
・world War I very fev,l Japanese intended to immigrate permanently to the United States, 
hoping rather to go back home eventually ・with fame and fortune. America was looked 
upon as a place to make money. This psychology stimulated remittances to, and "yen 
deposit" in, Japan. 
Due to several possible 'Nays of remitting money, it is not easy to ascertain how much 
money was actually sent back to Japan. :Money could be remitted at post of]自cesby way 
Df postal money orders and through Japanese exchange banks and American banks, while 
Japanese also carried ¥Vith them substantial amounts on their return or visits to their home-
land. One source suggests that in 1905 the Japanese in California, Utah and Idaho remitted 
some 9.4 million yen to Japan ¥vhile having a bank deposit of 3.5 million yen. According 
to the Foreign i¥1仏1istryof Japan, at the end of the 1920’s remittances from the mainland 
じnitedStates amounted to some 15 million yen, which constituted 55 percent of the total 
money sent back to Japan by overseas Japanese. If Hav¥raii is included, three fourths of al 
remittances originated from the United States. 5) The greater part of this ¥Vas from Cali-
fornia. 
The practice of making remittances back home created a dilemma. Remittances gave 
・satisfaction to many overseas Japanese and benefited those who remained in Japan. The 
money remitted to Japan by immigrants ¥Vas partly utilized to support families of emigrants, 
but more of it v-.ras used to purchase land. This oftentimes caused soaring land prices in 
such prefectures as Hiroshima, Wakayama, and Yamaguchi which sent more immigrants 
-overseas in a kind of circular response. On the other hand, the money earned by the 
Japanese in the United States did not benefit the local community nor provide the basis for 
further development. It also did not help to increase their credit ratings at American banks 
since the money deposited there did not stay long before being Vlithdrawn and sent back 
to Japan. This was promoted by Japanese foreign exchange banks, which originally had 
been established to promote the US-Japan trade but whose main function eventually became 
remittance transactions. This dollar drain had a minimal effect on the American economy, 
but it had a profound impact on Japanese immigrant communities. Lack of working capital 
and五nancialmachinery clearly slowed their successful integration into American society 
.and economy. 
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I. Japanese Foreign Exchange Banks 
Japanese interest in foreign exchange banking was largely stimulated by the expansion 
of the COUI〕try’seconomy since the middle of the nineteenth cent山γwhenJapan opened 
her doors to the outside world after more than two hundred years of the Tokugawa Sho-
g日nategovernment’s seclusion policy. Under the i〕rogramof industrialization and moderni-
zation of the Meiji government, Japan experienced a remarkable industrial growth, creating 
an expanding pattern of foreign trade. Raw silk constituted the major Japanese commodity 
exported to the United States. Although in the late 1860’s most Japanese raw silk was 
exported to Europe, by tl〕eearly 1880's the United States had become Japan’s leading market 
for this commodity. Around 1925 eighty percent of Japan's silk export went to the United 
States, the rav-7 silk industry in Japan serving as the major supplier to the American silk 
fabric industry. As Japan’s major moηey earner, the raw silk industry received good 
financial backing from the Yokohama Specie Bank. 
The Yokohama Specie Bank was established in Yokohama in February 1880 as a semi-
governmental foreign exchange bank under the National Banlく Ordinanceissued one year 
earlier. 'fhe Bank was capitalized at three million yen at the time of organization, one-
th i・d of which was invested by the Meiji government. This institution became a special 
bank under the Yokohama Specie Banl王Ordinenceissued in 1887 and specializing in foreign 
exchange business. Employees were dispatched to New York in the summer of 1880 to 
investigate rnethods of foreign banking. This mission led to the establishment of the New 
York branch of the bank. In June, 1886, a San Francisco ageロcy¥Vas established in the 
Phelan Building on ?vlarket Street, responding to the expanding trade between California 
ancl Japan. G〕
Among che San Francisco ageηcy’s functions was that of transferring of deposits made 
m Havvaii government-sponsored immigrant workers under the ag了eementbetween the 
Japanese and Hawaiian governments starting in 1885. Those immigrants were to lay aside 
a certain amount of money from their salaries, which was, at the beginning, kept by the 
Hawaiian government. When the Japanese Consulate General took over this business, the 
deposits were sent to the Yokohama Specie BanlピsSan F了anciscoagency, then were trans-
ferred to Japan to be deposited at the Ministry of Finance. Eventually the Yokohama Specie 
Bank took over the entire business of transferring workers’deposits, establishing an agency 
in Honolulu in 1892. Initially the bank took over some 730,000 yen of those government-
sponsored immigrants’deposit, the amount gradually increasing to as much as 1.5 million 
yen. However, after the expiration of the contract terms, most of these deposits were 
'Nithdrawn, as many immigrants either went back to Japan or moved to the mainland of 
the United States. Some opened ordinary deposit accounts. This Honolulu agency, which 
developed into a branch five years later, functioned to absorb the ordinary deposits of the 
increasing number of Japanese immigrants in Havrnii.n 
Contrary to expectations, the San Francisco agency’s foreign trade transactions were 
found to be extremely limited, and therefore so was its relation with the London Branch 
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which controlled this agency in California. The agency’s main function turned out to be 
七九nd!ingdeposits and remittances of the Japanese immigrants of Hawaii and the San Fran-
cisco areas. The San I了1・anciscoagency thus became an independent branch in 1896, con-
trolling the agency in Hav._raii. In February, 1913, an agency of the San Francisco branch 
of the Yolrnhama Specie Bank ¥Vas established in downtovrn Los Angeles in order to handle 
deposits and remittance of the Japanese in southern California. Four years later another 
agency ¥Vas opened in Seattle. Ordinarγdeposits gradually increased, and as of the encl of 
Februanヘ 1920, the total deposits at the main office in Yokohama collected through such 
branches as Ha＼五店i.San Francisco, Los Angeles, and Seattle amounted to over 50 million 
yen.日）
The Sumitomo Bank. a private bank established in 1885 with main o印cesin Osaka, 
was the second Japanese bank to expand its operation to the United States. Remittances 
from Ha¥vaii and the ¥Vest Coast of the United States to the branches of the Sumitomo 
Bank in the western pan of Japan、themajor emigration districts of the country, increased 
year after year. These expanding remittances promoted the bank’s interest in the foreign 
exchange business. The San Francisco agency was opened in September, 1916, in dO¥vntown 
San Francisco oηCalifornia Srree仁川 Their Seattle and New York branches followed two 
years later. io) A second branch in California was established in Los Angeles, in the heart 
of the Japanese quarter. iロ1924. The following year a third branch was formed in Sacra-
mento, another cemer of Japanese populmion, as the Sumitomo Bank of California. In Hawaii 
the Sumitomo Bank of Hawaii ¥Vas estal〕lishedin 1916. 1) 
Because of their nature as foreign exchange banks, branches of the Yokohama Specie 
Bank and the Sumirnrno Baηk seldom extended loans and therefore ¥Vere not of much help 
to small Japanese businessmen and farmers in California.1~ ） Only through so-called .:special 
loansり couldthe Yokohan1a Specie Bank provide local Japanese vヘrithlimited funds. 
The first special loan at the San Fr・anciscobranch was extended to Japanese agricul-
turists ¥vho sought to purchase farmland before the Alien Land Law took effect in 1913. 
Agriculture was the major economic activity of the Japanese and their participation in 
agriculture was gradually increasing through the leasing or purchase of land. Many of 
them, however, had not quite acquired titles to the land due to yearly installments or de-
ferred payment, ・when the Alien Land Law of California went into effect on August 10, 
1913, restricting Japanese purchase and lease of agricultural land. Purchase of land became 
the major concern among Japanese farmers. The Japanese government unofficially requested 
the Yokohama Specie Bank barnch to advance loans to Japanese enabling them to acquire 
completed land titles. Under the program initiated, the total loans were to be limited to 
$ 150, 000, the term of a loan being five years at six to seven percent interest. Loans ¥Vere 
to be made only for the purchase of farm or nursery land. A temporary company was to 
be organized by influential persons among debtors so that each individual may transfer his 
land to this company as an asset on which mortgage may be settled. Some 83,000 dollars 
were extended under this program until its termination on August 9. This was well below 
the amount of loans authorized. All the loans were successfullv collected. i:n 
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Five years later the Yokohama Specie Bank launched another special loan program. It 
was decided in 1918 to extend long-term special loans to Japanese engaged in agriculture 
and industry. The notice given by the executive department to the San Francisco, Los 
Angeles, Seattle, and Hawaii branches pointed that although there used to be very few who 
were qualified to receive loans, despite large demands for them, the status of the Japanese 
remarkably advanced by the increase of agricultural production and small scale businesses 
were also emerging. In order to promote the germination of promising businesses, the bank 
decided to make special loans. H) The number of applications gradually increased, and as 
of February, 1920, the balance of loans outstanding amounted to some 300,000 yen. is) How-
ever, excepting the above mentioned special loans, few funds were available from the bank. 
Thus complaints grew among the Japanese that the bank absorbed much capital but be 
grudged making loans. ii;) 
Branches of Japanese banks in the United States were al closed with the outbreak of 
US-Japan war in 1941 and were eventually disbanded. This brought disaster to Japanese 
¥vlrn had made“yen deposi 仁川~）
III. Local Japanese-ov司medBanks 
Several抗日mptswere made to establish banks among California Japanese during the 
first decade of this century. As the primary port of entry and center of Japanese immi-
gration to the ＼町estCoast, San Francisco felt a growing need for financial institutions even 
before the turn of the century, when Japanese engaged in farming and railroad work started 
to turn their interest to small businesses. The first to be established was Nichibei Kinyusha 
(Japanese-American Financial Company) organized in 1899. This was expanded to become 
Ni chi i〕eiGinko (Japanese-American Bank) in 1903, a bank approved under California's bank-
ing law, capitalized at事20,000. The Nippon Ginko (Japaηese Bank of San Francisco) was 
incorporated in San Francisco as a second Japanese bank in 1903, while the Kinman Ginko 
was founded a couple of years later. Another, the Imperial Bank of San Francisco, was 
incorporated in 1901. is) 
With the economic expansion and increase of the Japanese population of Los Angeles, 
three of these San Francisco-based Japanese banks established branches in this southland 
city: The Japanese-American Bank in April 1904, the Kinman Ginko in February 1906, and 
the Japanese Bank of San Francisco in November 1906. All these were located in the heart 
of the Japanese quarter of downtovm Los Angeles. is) 
In addition to San Francisco and Los Angeles, such places as Oakland, Sacramento, 
Vacaville and Fresno had Japanese司ownedbanks (Table l). Sacramento, one of the major 
centers of Japanese agricultural activities before lヘ1orld ＼ヘrar I, had two Japanese banks. 
The Japanese Bank of Sacramento was organized in 1904 1905 as a private bank and was 
incorporated in 1906. The Nippon Savings Ban！王 ofSacramento 'Nas incorporated in Septem-
ber 1907. After temporarily closing late in 1909, it reopened as the Nippon Bank, adding a 
savings department. The Oakland Japanese Bank was incorporated in October 1907, and 
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Table 1. Local Japanese Banks in California 
Name and Location Establishment 
SAN FEANCISCO 
Japanese-American Bank 
Japanese Bank of San Francisco 
Kinmon Ginlrn 
Imperial Bank 
LOS ANGELES 
Japanese-American B:rnk 
Japanese Bank of San Francisco 
Kinmon Gin¥rn 
OAKLAND 
Oakland Japanese Bank 
O'Fu Savings Bank 
SACRAMENTO 
Japanese Bank of Sacramemo 
Nippon Savings Bank 
FRESNO 
Kamikawa Bros. Bank of Fresno 
Industrial Bank of Fresno 
VACAVILLE 
fuso Ginko 
不 Dateof incorporation. 
a: Incorporated on February l, 1906. 
b: Incorporated on November 2, 1906. 
1903a 
1905 
1905 06 
6/18/07 
4/04 
11/06 
2/06 
10/30/07ネ
1/2/08* 
1905b 
9/25/07本
10/1/08 
2/13/08 
1906 
Bank Closed 
10/18/09 
1907 08 
3/29/09 
8/27/08 
10/18/09 
3/29/09 
9/16/09 
1909 
10/ 13/09 
1924C 
1911 
1922ゴ
1909 
c: Suspended on October 19, 1909, and reopened on December 6, 1909. 
d : Suspended on October 26, 1909, and reoponed on January 2S, 1910. 
Liquidation closed 
8/7 /22 
9/30/21 
10/5/09 
8/13/20 
Source: California State Board of Bank Commissioners, Re戸ortof the Board of Banた
Conirηissioηers of the State of Califoγnia; California State Banking Department, Annual 
Report of the Superintendent of Banl<s. 
the O’fu Savings Bank, in January 1908 in this East Bay city. In Fresno, the major agri-
cultural center of the San Joaquin Valley, the Kamikawa Brothers Bank of Fresno and the 
Industrial Bank of Fresno ¥Vere incorporated in 1908. In Vacaville where the Japanese 
started to settle as far口i workers as early as late 1890’s, the Fuso Ginko ＂νas incorporated 
in 1900. 
Although there ¥Vas a mushrooming of Japanese banks in the first years of this century, 
they soon found themselves caught in the nation-wide economic recession of 1907. During 
1907 alone there were a total of 11 857 business failures in the United States of which 132 
were banks. In California this 1907 panic was responsible for the enforced closing of 16-
state chartered banks and for voluntary liquidation of many other banks. 20l Furthermore, 
the “Bank Act”of California, approved on March 1, 1909, severely hit institutions with a 
weak economic basis. But by the time the act took effect in July, some of the Japanese 
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banks had either already closed their doors or were in bad financial conditions. The year 
1909 was the worst year for Japanese banks. In March, the Kinmon Ginko, which had 
earlier absorbed the Los Angeles branch of the Japanese Banl王 of San Francisco, closed, 
followed by the suspension of the Oakland Japanese Bank in September, the Japanese-
American Bank and the Japanese Bank of Sacramento in October. By the end of the year, 
three Japanese banks in San Francisco and their branches in Los Angeles, two Oakland 
banks, one Sacramento bani王 and the Vacaville bank had already gone out of business. 
Among three remaining banks, the Kamikawa Brothers Bank of Fresno closed their door 
after喝 threeyears in business. The Industrial Banl《ofFresno and the Nippon Bank of Sacra-
mento, though they ¥Vere temporarily suspended in late 1909, survived until 1922 and 1924, 
respectively. The Nippon Bank of Sacramento, facing a critical condition in 1920, was 
purchased by the Hirabayashigumi of Osaka, Japan, thereby continuing the business and 
saving many Japanese depositors. However, four years later the bank ¥Vas finally suspended, 
becoming the basis of the Sumitomo Bank of California mentioned earlier. 21) 
According to the California State Superintendent of Banks, these failures were caused 
mainly by mismanagement and sometimes by embezzlement by officials. A superintendent 
stated in the 1910 report：“The Japanese banks now in liquidation .. are in very bad cmト
dition. The fact that the records were kept in Japanese made it extremely hard for us to 
arrive at a correct knowledge of their position. Their affairs show that they were simply 
looted. Crin1inal prosecutions, as yet, have not been commenced, because most of the trans-
actions were affected before the present law went into effect, and also because of our in-
ability on account of incomplete records (in Japanese) of fastening specific acts upon indivi-
duals . "2~ ） In a 1922 report it ¥Vas again mentioned：“... the Japanese banks are particulary 
difficult to handle because of the methods of the banks that failed and because of the dif四
五culty in locating the various debtors and in ascertaining if they had any resources to 
realize upoη．．．川り
Bankruptcy of Japanese banks caused a panic in the Japanese communities in California. 
One of the五rstto close the door ¥Vas the Kinrnon Ginko. When remittances to Japan 
through this institution were delayed, rumors caused a ruηon a bank. This banl三closed
its door both in San Francisco and Los Angeles on Ivlarch 29, 1909. The bank ¥Vas formally 
suspended three months later. The Japanese Association of America took this banl汀uptcy
very seriously not only because of the damage done to depositors and to Japanese economic 
interests, l〕utalso because this bankruptcy could cause a loss of credit for the emir‘e Japanese 
community. The Association established a special con1mittee to cope ¥Vith this bankruptcy, 
working ¥Vith cle1〕ositorsas well as the Ja1〕anesebusiness community. All the artempts to 
a void it and save the b0nk, hO¥vever, ¥Vere unsuccessful. "1〕
Probably the most serious blow to the j日panesecommunity came on the morning of 
October 18, 1909, when the Japanese-American Bank branches in San Francisco and Los 
Ang・elesboth clo弓eltheir号 doorson the order of the Superintenclenc of Banks of California. 
A consultation w日sheld日tfour 0・clockof the same day in Los Angeles. The resolution 
passed a工themeeting sough仁tor十establishthe b日nk,em1〕hasizingthat the closing of it 
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totally di妊eredfrom that of other banks and that al Japanese business屯couldbe in jeopardy 
provided the bad王wouldnot be able to reopen unfortunately. 26) An open meeting of deposi-
tors of the Los Angeles branch of the Japanese-American Bank was held in downtown Los 
Angeles on November 4, 1909, with over 500 in attendance. About one year after suspen-
sion of the bank, the Superintendent of Banks provided a very pessimistic view, stating: 
“the chances for a dividend to the general creditors of the Bank in the near future are not 
very promising.円26) Five years after its bankruptcy, creditors ¥Vere stil waiting for their 
dividend. The liquidation of the banl王wascompleted in August, 1922. 27) 
That banks were established by many other California ethnic groups was clearly incli-
cated in early reports of the state’s Superintendent of Banks. Some of these were successful 
and some were not. Many Japanese banks obviously belonged to the second ・group. In 
contrast to the Japanese, the Chinese established only one banl王inSan Francisco, the Canton 
Bank, in 1907. To serve some 100,000 Chinese in the United States and Mexico, the bank 
was organized by local Chinese under the initiative of Look Tin Eli, a n-ian of considerable 
experience in the banking business. After being in business for nearly two decades, the 
Canton Bank v,ras closed by the Superintendent of the Banks in July, 1926. One of the 
functions of this bank, too, was remittances of funds to China. zs) Probably the group which 
stood in sharpest contrast to the Japanese was the Italians. In order to serve the large 
Italian community of San Francisco, the Columbus Savings & Loan Society was organized 
in 1893, out of which the Italian-American Bank, Fugazi Banca Popolare Operaia Italiana, 
and Bank of Italy grew. Among these the Bank of Italy, which evolved into the present 
day Bank of America, developed into one of the largest banks in the world under the direc由
工ionof A. P. Giannini. 29) 
IV. Rotating Credit Associations 
Lack of credit led to the prevalence of purely ethnic, self-defensive financial systems 
among the Japanese in California. Rotating credit associations have been widely employed 
around the world with various local names and variations in practice. :rn) "The idea of rotat-
ing credit clubs, variously called tanonwshi, tanomos!u」o,m.ujin, mujin-l<o, or simply lw in 
Japan, 31〕 wastransplanted into the United States with Japanese immigrants. This ethnic 
organization became an actively utilized source of finance and helped many early business 
ventures, although the amount of funds available through these operations was limited. 
While tanomoshi were practiced by the Japanese both in rural and urban California, it was 
probably in cities that they were most actively operated and utilized by small businessmen. 
Tanonwshi is a mutual financial aid club of the common people in which credit rotates 
among members. 32) It consists of an o_va (dealer) and its members. They meet regularly, 
perhaps monthly, and each contributes a certain amount of money regula了ly. Each mern ber 
has access to the loan by turns, the order being decided by bidding or lottery. After al 
the members have had access to the loan, it is dissolved. 33) Tanomoshi grεatly expanded in 
the Edo period in Japan as a financial institutions of the mass. It was utilizeed by com-
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mercial and industrial interests to obtain working funds as well as by the general public. 
It prospered before and even after the establishment of modern五nancial facilities, some 
・developing to become large companies. Throughout the pre-World War I period it con-
tinued to be the principal people’s financing source in Japan. 
The successful operation of tanonwshi depended on the integrity and honesty of the 
members. The first member to receive the fund becomes a debtor to al the other partici-
pants and continues to be so until the completion of tcmomoshi. The last to receive the 
fund is a creditor to al other members. For the completion of a cycle, mutual trust is 
fundamental. Therefore, traditionally only those who know each other well organized 
tanomoshz, and the organizer often personally selected the participants. Therefore among 
the Japanese immigrants in the United States, it was most frequently organized by those 
from the same prefecture and those in the same trade. This type of financial clubs func-
tion effectively as long as the mutual trust is maintained among members, while they always 
have clangers of failure. When installments were high, there was a possibility that the 
completion of installment payments was endangered. There were people who su百ereddam-
.age from tanomoshi, and sometimes it led even to the break・－upof friendships. :i.i〕
In March through April 1921, the bankruptcy of several tanomoshi caused a great panic 
in the financial circles of the Japanese in Los Angeles. This brought about a chaotic con-
<lition, which some took advantage of. The total damage, estimated at some $ 200,000, had 
an even greater impact on the community than did the bankruptcy of Kinmon Ginko over 
a decade earlier. Under the general economic depression, many Japanese business used 
tanomoshi funds for their business. Many avoided destruction by temporarily reducing in-
stallments to alleviate the financial burden on members. 35〕 Thepreservation of this not 
too favorable, but indispensable，五nancialsystem became inevitable under these circumstances. 
The Japanese Chamber of Commerce of Southern California discussed the issue in June, 
1921, seeking to organize a protective association of tanomoshi. The Los Angeles Protective 
Association of Tanomoshi-ko and General Finance (Rafu Tanomoshi-ko Ippan Kinyu Hogo 
Kyokai) was thus established, the inaugural meeting being held a month later. 36> 
Although the number of tanomoshi decreased after the great failures of the spring of 
1921, the situation fully recovered in terms of numbers one year after this panic despite the 
fact that many people had become aware of the danger and high interest charges of tano-
moshi. The depr・essionin business was severe at the time, the money situation was tight 
.and bank loanswere not easily available. Although tanomoshi ended up posing high interest 
rates, it vrns one of the fe¥v ¥Vays for small businessmen to finance their on-going business 
.and new business ventures. Most of tanomoshi used by small businessmen were those re-
quiring relatively large installments, i.e. from 50 to 100 dollars, thus being especially in 
danger of failure. :m 
According to one estimate there existed some 150 to 160 tanomoshi in southern California 
in the late 1910's, with monthly loans amounting to more than 150,000 dollars. Another 
estimate suggests that there v,rere at least 200 tanonwshi which required one installment of 
.$ 100 and as many that required a $ 35 to $ 50 installment in Los Angeles in 1922. It could 
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be estimated that more than $ 500,000 were accumulated and used through tanomoshz in Los 
Angeles in this period. :is) Financial associations organized by trade and prefectural groups 
were few and the Japanese business circle of Los Angeles heavily depended on tοnomoshi 
for financing. 
In time some improvements were made in the legal status of tanomoshz. Since it was 
often considered as a type of lottery, its legal aspect was obscure, which made failures 
especially tragic. When tanomoshi failed, it was not too clear where the responsibility lay. 
Even if it ¥Vere evident ¥Vho was responsible, there was no legal power to require fulfilling 
one’s responsibilities. The philosophy behind the entire practice of tanomoshi was that of 
the“gentlemen’s agreement.” However, one court decision in Hawaii in 1914 stated that 
tanomoshi was a kind of savings organization with legal standing and that it was illegal 
for members to disobey the regulations of the organization.：川 A court decision made in 
San Joaquin county in 1930 also vested tanomoshi ＼ヘriththe legal status when a decision was 
handed down in favor of complainants requesting two guarantors to pay them some 800 
dollars. The decision was to protect this informal ethnic financial system at least in this 
county. 10l 
In Japan, some of the tanomoshz or mujm ¥Vhich originated and developed as mutual aid 
association of an informal nature developed into modern company organizations in Meiji era, 
¥Videly known as eigyo-mu刀・n(business mujin) or nw;zn-kαishα（mujin company) . .ii) Tanomoshi 
did not develop into formal business organizations among the Japanese in the United States, 
but continued to function at the informal level. Larger scale finances ¥Vere undertaken by 
五nancialassociations and credit unions. 
V. Savings Associations and Credit Unions 
In the Japanese communities in California, although tanomoshi ¥Vas very common and 
widely practiced, savings associations and credit unions also played an important role. Their 
function was intermediate betv.reen completely informal rotating credit associations and banks 
¥Vhich most Japanese did not have access to. Savings associations were widely organized 
before ¥¥TorJd War I, while credit unions were actively utilized immediately after the vrnr・2
when different types of problems and needs arose. 
Before ＼可orldWar I, savings associations were generally organized by trade and pre-
fectural groups. Japanese overseas communities, of course, consisted of individuals from 
various parts of Japan. In communities of mixed origin, mutual trust tended to be lacking 
and sanctions could not readily be taken against those of differing regional origins. This 
created a serious problem with五nancialassociations larger than tanomoshi, which had to 
depend heavily on mutual trust. In such context, most financial associations before the war 
had developed with prefectural associations and Japanese trade organizations, so that both 
mutual trust, sanctions and discipline could be better practiced. 
Although it is difficult to give an overall picture of Japanese savings associations in 
California due to the lack of data, we are able to look at some parts of this economic 
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activity. In southern California the白rstamong the prefectural associations to start a sav時
ings association was Nagano prefecture (organized in 1907) which opened its association in 
1909. 42) In 1917 there were sixteen Japanese financial associations in southern California, 
eleven being organized as regional-based associations and五veas trade associations. Their 
reserve fund at this time amounted to some 50,000 dollars.・13) 
Hiroshima lzenjiηwere those most actively engaged in五nancialassociations partly be-
cause of their large number in California. Among organizations established by them in the 
mid 1910’s, eight had savings associations, located in San Francisco, Fresno, Sacramento, 
Florin, Isleton, Walnut Grove, and Los Angeles. In the late 1920’s Hiroshima kenがれ were
stil operating the same number of financial associations. H) Those from Fukuoka prefecture, 
another・ largesource area for immigrants, had established four financial associations, in 
addition to various lwnjin!wi, overseas associations, and county and regional associations. m 
Some of the Japanese trade organizations had their own五nancial associations. The 
Japanese Businessmen's Association of Los Angeles, for example, had its own savings and 
loan association, which was started in 1914 with 35 shareholders. The California Flower 
Growers Association from its establishment in 1ヲ06in San Francisco provided mutual五nanc-
ing using its own investment and reserve funds. The Redwood City Nurserymen’s Associa-
tion, composed of certain members of the California Flower Market in San Francisco, oper-
ated in the same fashion.4＂〕 Althoughmost of the pre『warJapanese五nancialassociations 
were organized by Issei, some were established under Nisei initiative. The Japanese 
American Savings Association had been organized in Los Angeles in 1929 by 25 Nisei. 
Although primarily intended as a savings and loan association, it also promoted social 
activities.47) 
'These savings and financial associations were functioning well until the Great Depres-
sion. Al though most of the associations continued to exist, none of them was so active as 
formerly. Since it was difficult to collect outstanding loans once made, they kept their 
funds rather than taking a chance of advancing loans. 48) 
Japanese financial associations, shut down as a result of lへ＇orld＼ヘrar I, were reactivated 
after the ¥Var, especially in southern California where Japanese were more numerous than 
in any other region of the continental United States. Two major problems that Japanese 
returnees had to face were housing shortages and employment. In southern California 
especially, credit unions reestablished under state approval and protection, tended to be 
equipped with more rational and long-term perspectives than those in the pre-war period. 
In the Pasadena area alone, Japanese credit unions were said to have helped members pur-
chase some 500 houses.49) 
The first officially approved post-war credit union among the Japanese in southern Cali-
fornia was organized under the auspices of the Japanese American Citizens League (JACL) 
jη1949. During the evacuation period it had been recommended that credit unions be 
organized at relocation centers. The JACL adopted this as one of their policies in anticipa鴫
tion of reconstruction after the relocation per‘iod. The credit union under JACL aimed at 
accumulating one million仁lollarswith a membership of 1,000 depositing ten dollars a month 
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for eleven years. The membership as of the end of 1959 numbered 367, tl1e total property 
amounting to some $ 112,000 and total loans，事96,000. These figures ¥Vere far below the 
initial target, clue mainly to the emergence of other competing credit unions. 50) 
The largest among the Japanese停ovrneclcredit unions was the Los Angeles Southwest 
Japanese Credit Union. It started as Los Angeles Southwest Savings Association mafu 
Seinan Chochiku Kurniai) in 1945 with the initial aim to provide funds for purchasing houses. 
1へTithinfive years of organization, membership was only 30, but 25 of these had been helped 
in purchasing homes. By 1960 it had 2,454 members and reserve funds of事670,000. ＼ヘ＇ith
the growing numbers of functions of Japanese credit unions in southern California, the 
Southern California Japanese Credit and Savings Unions Association was established in 1953, 
consisting of eight credit unions. Under the guidance of this association, two other credit 
unions were later organized. The total capital of the a伍liatedcredit unions was estimated 
in 1959 to be some $ 2,500, 000. 5D 
As economic recovery progressed and houses ¥Vere purchased, these Japanese credit 
unions Jost much of the vigor they had in the recovery years immediately after World ＼へ1ar 
I. But many of them continued to exist. The ]a戸aneseAmerican Directory of 1971 listed 
eight Japanese C了editunions in southe了nCalifornia. 52) 
Conclusion 
Immigrants were generally in unfavorable positions to finance their early ventures in 
the new land, and the Japanese were no exception. The financial mechanism existed in the 
community of Japanese immigrants consisted of formal and informal levels (Fig 
IV. 
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we have seen in this paper, ethnic ties played an important role at both levels. At the 
formal lepel, banks were established including local Japanese banks as well as branches of 
banks in Japan. But neither made much contribution to the local Japanese economy, for 
locally established banks by Japanese immigrants were shortlived and the branches of Jap-
anese foreign exchange banks had little interest in making a loan for promoting Japanese 
economic activities. Immigrants, who were highly preoccupied with remitting money back 
home, did not have much access to funds at American banks. Small scale ethnic finances 
at the informal level were more successful, the concept often having been introduced from 
Japan. Rotating credit associations called tanomoshi and savings associations and credit 
unios belonged to this category. Such ethnic五nancialsystems were more actively utilized 
amoηg urban Japanese than those engaged in farming. 
Japanese farmers had access to so-called dealer credit, belonging to the informal level 
in our schema, which was once a common way of financing fruit and vegetable production 
in the United States. Japanese who started as farm laborers soon began to climb the agri-
cultural ladder, becoming independent farm operators, and this evolution was possible with 
but small amounts of capital. Farmers could borrow money on the security of crops from 
either local dealers or large eastern companies, while their groceries could be purchased on 
credit from local retailers, to be paid for at the close of the year. Those who advanced 
credit to the Japanese included not only individuals and companeis engaged in the purchase, 
sale and distribution of fruits and vegetables but packers and canners and beet sugar fac時
tories, whose monetary advances were often enough to cover the planting, harvesting, 
packing and crating costs and even lease payments. The whole picture of五nancialprob-
lerns and conditions of rural Japanese immigarnts cannot be complete without scrutinizing 
such dealer credit, but it must be treated on another occasion. 
This study was partly supported by the scientific research grant of the Ministry of 
Education, Culture and Science of Japan (Shoreikenkyu A 61780274). 
Notes 
1) Ivan H. Light (1972) : Ethηic Enterprise in America, Berkeley. See, for example，“Symposium on 
Ethnic Ente1－戸risein America，円 Jouγnalof Ethnic Studies 1, (1974), 69-88. 
2) Nihonjin Chuo Nokai (1909) : Rono Konshinlwi Kinen, Sacramento, 2-4, 13-14, 25 30. 
3) Raju Shimpo, 4 April 1915. 
4) Raju Shi1η戸o,16, 18, 20, 21, 22 August 1914. 
5) Zaibei Nihonjin Kyogikai (1907) : Hoたoたusho1, p. 67, Tsunegoro Hirota (1931) : Zaibez・FukuoたG
J{enJinshi, Los Angeles, 30 31. 
6) Yokohama Shokin Ginko (1920a): Yolwhama Shahin Ginkosh』：， Yokohama, 24-25; idem (1920b) ・ 
Yolwha mα ShoたinCiηたoshiFurolw, Yokohama, 291 
7) Yokohama Shokin Ginko, (1920a), op. cit., footnote 6, 137-139; idem (1920b), op. cit., footnote 6, 
498-500. 
8) Yokohama Shokin Ginko (1920a), op. cit., footnote 6, 157-158, 139, 409-410, 461, idem (1920b), op. 
cit., footnote 6, 529-530. 
ig.4 
9) This was incorporated on August 11, 1916, received state permission on August 22, and opened on 
September 15, 1916. Eighth Annual Re戸artof the Superintendent of Banbng 1917, p. 777. 
10) The Seattle branch was reorganized into the Sumitomo Bank of Seattle in 1920, incorporated under・
the state law, capitalized at $200,000. Sumitomo Ginko (1926): Sumitomo Gin!w Sanjuηenshi, Osaka, 
p. 178. 
11) Sumitomo Ginkoshi Hensan linkai (1955): Sumitomo Ginlwshi, Osaka, p. 23, 175-177; Sumitomo 
Ginko, op. cit., footnote 10, 179 180. 
12) In the late 1920’s there were sixteen Japanese b2nks in the mainland United States, the majority 
being branches of estal〕lishecl Japanese institutions. Zaibei Nihonjinkai (1940) : Zoibei Nihonfinlwi, 
San Francisco, p. 118. 
13) Yokohama Shokin Ginko (l920a), op. cit., footnote 6, 419 422. For detailed private rules of those 
special loan program, see Yokohorna Shokin Ginko (1920b), op. cit., footnote 6, 1076 1080 
14) Yokohama Shokin Ginko (l920b), op. cit., footnote 6, 1162-1163. 
15) Yokohama Shokin Ginko (1920a), op. cit., footnote 6, 169 472. 
16) The manager of the Los Angeles branch of the Yokohama Specie Bank furnished loans to several 
Japanese businessmen at the time of the Great Dei〕ressionin the early 1930’s, bl・eakingthe baniく’S
tradition. These unfortunately we1‘e defaulted and he was forced to resign f 1・omthe position. Nanka 
Nikkeijin Shogyo iくaigisho(1960): ]¥Tan Kashu Nihonjin Shichijunensh人LosAngeles, l〕. 163. 
17) After the war, and based on the tradition of the Yokohama Specie Bank, the Bank of Tokyo, Inc. 
was organized in December 1946. In 1952 the Bank of Tokyo of California was incoq〕orated,which 
developed into the p了esentday California .Firsc Bank absorbing the Southern California First Bank in 
October 1975. Other Japanese banks appeared in California after the war and were incorporated under 
California banking laws, which have been more helpful to local Japanese communities than bad those 
in existence before the war. 
18〕 ZaibeiNihonjin Kai, op. cit., footnote 12, p. 279. The name of “Nichibei Kinyu Sha," however, 
did not appear in 1900, 1901, and 1902 editions of San Francisco city directories. The 1903 edition 
lists Nichibei Bank (Japanese“American Bank) located at 524 GearγStreet. Croclwr-Langley San 
Francisco Directory, San Franζisco, 1903, p. 1371 and 2017. The Nippon Ginko capitalized at $100,000. 
Ira B. Cross (1927) : Fυiancing aη Em戸ire, History of BonJ21:11g in Colif07’nia, Chicago and San 
Francisco, p. 163. 
19) During the 五scal year 1907 08, the Los Angeles branch of the Japanese Bank of San Francisco 
was sold to the Kinmon Ginko. At this time the Los Angeles Cle2ring House Association passed a 
regulation which required its members to jコossessa minimum capital stock of .$200,000. This action 
resulted in a number of mergers among banks in Los Angeles. Cross, op. cit., footnote 18, p. 708. 
20) ibid., 704 705. 
21) The Sumitomo Bank came up with the idea of estal〕lishinga bank in Cc.lifornia to handle ordinary 
deposits by purcras;ng a local savings bank. It originally sought to purchase the Industrial Bank of 
Fresno, but this ended unsuccessfully in 1921. The Nippon Bank of Sacramento was in bad financial 
condition, being ordered to close by the end of 1924. r「heassets of the iコank¥Vas sold to the Sumi-
tomo Bank of California, which started its business in March 1925. Sumitomo Ginkosbi Hensan Iin司
kai, op. cit., footnote 11, 130-131. 
22) California State Superintendent of Banks (1910): First Aηnual RejJort of the Suρerintendent of 
Banks, p. 6. 
23) California State Superintendent of Banks, (1922) : Thirteenth AnημαJ Re戸ortof the SujJerintendent 
195 
。I13αn丸s,p. 5. 
24) Zaibei Nihonjinkai (1909) : Zoibei八＇ihonjinlwiKrziho 1, p. 2-4. Creditors eventually received 28 
cents on each dollar. Cross, op. cit., footnote 18, p. 693. 
25) Nanka Nikkeijin Shogyo Kaigisl〕0 (1956）：入＇on］（「zshu八Tihonjinshi,Los /¥ngeles, p. 172. 
26) California State Banking Department, op. cit., footnote 22, 536-537. 
27) Raju Shi1ηjJo, 18, 19, 20 Decernl〕er1914; California State Sui〕erintenclentof Banks, op. cit., foot-
note 23, 500 501. 
28) Cross, op. cit., footnote 18, 699 700; Stale J3an!?in.r;βu!letin 2, February, 1928, 4-6 
29) Marquis James and Bessie R James, (1954）： βiogrα戸hyofαβanlc, The Story ofβαn!? of .11ησnco, 
New York. 
30) Shirley /¥rdener (1964) 'J、heCornparati ve Study of Eotating Credit Associations, The journal of 
!he Royal _,1nlhrojJological lnslilule of the Creal Britain ond Ireland 94, part 2, 201-299; Clifford 
Geertz (1962) : The Eotatin日 CreditAssociation: a 'Middle J~unピ in Development, Economic Deueloか
me11！αnd Cυlturol Change 10, 241-262 
31) In the western part of Japan, i仁 wasusually called Jαnomoshi, whereas the term muym was used 
in the eastern part of〔hecountry. Ko originally mean仁 agroup of learned priests who read scri p司
ture, but it later expanded its form and functions to include religious group, i〕ilgrirnages, and econo-
mic, recreational, ancl professional gatherings. l、rthe roles of these /uJ in the Japanese wa)1 of life, 
see Tok utaro Sal、urai (1962) : Ko Shuda11 Seir£tsu Xotei no Kenl::yu, Tokyo 
32） γhere is not yet a single cle日nitiveexplanation as to the origin of the term lonoη10shi. Some 
argue that the Japanese e〔iuivalent of the English wo1てl"dependable" was used for this practice of 
several people coming to父etherfor mutual financial benefi〔S Some explain that it is the transfor-
mation of the ex i〕ression“tanornuno ashi" where“ashi" means money and "tanornu円 meansto ask, 
signi f yin日 its mutual aicl日ctivities. /¥ccorclinは to others ia11omoshi is thεcontraction of "tano“ 
munoshiro" which meant a kine] of mutual aid organization, a relic form of an ancient tax system, 
the same name being ap！〕iiecl to the contemporary rnurnal aid associations. 。〔herst:hink that tano-
moshi was transformed from 心tanomu" (to ask), originating from the practice that temples and 
shrines arl-:ecl their parishioners to contribute for the repair of temple and shrine structures when 
they were clamagecl. Kennosuke Yui (1935) : Tonomoshi-lw lo Sono Horilsu Kon!?ei, Tokyo, p. 2. 
33) Some fαnomoshi had specific l〕urposes. It ¥¥・as reported that in Hawaii lo11omosh£ were organized 
to I〕Ul・chasespeci日ccommodities. For example, "suit Iαnomoshz”was for each member to obtain a 
suic in turn, while givin巳 atailor good business opi〕ortunities. Euth N. !vlasucla (1937) : The Japanese 
イrnnomoshi',Socio! Process in Hau刀i3, i〕. 17. 
31） ドor Lhose well-off 1〕eople who could delay obtaining their share. tonomoshi had a function of a 
savings account. 'They enjoyed receiving interest from funds of members who received shares in 
earlier turns. When the economy was tight and man>' people wanted mone)', each tried to outbid 
others to utilize such funds. Wealthy l〕eoplecould actually joi口 morethan one tonomoshi in search 
of such profits, although there were always risks that the cycle would not be cornpletecl. 
35）“Sohma Shoten円 and"Iくem1〕uShokai”are men〔ioneclas examples of big tanomoshi failures ac this 
period. It was suggested that hi又h bidding i〕erestricte仁ito avoid unnecessary competition among 
members ancl that只uarantorsc日r)'more responsibilitv ancl be restricted to those who were highlv 
qualified. Ro(u ShimjJO 4. 20. 30 April 1921, l !¥fav 1921. 
36) The Japanese Chamber of Commerce of Southern California，“Eecorcl iプ 92-94and p. 99, Box 272, 
j人民PCollection, UCLA. 'l、0 help nrnintain the order in iclllomoshi i〕ractice, soci乳lsanction was to 
196 
be imposed on dishonest and fraudulent members and on general debtors who conceal thei1ザ property,
conduct fraudulent bankruptcy, or behave irresponsibly by notifying Japanese Associations, comme1二
cial associ引；ionsand Japanese Consulates in the United States of such information as permanent aclclress, 
home address, name, features as well as al of his dishonest and fraudulent conduct and by publish-
ing statements in the Japanese language newp2.pers in the United States in order to notify the fellow 
countrymen of dishonest and fraudulent acts (1へrticle18）.γhe director or head of each tanomoshi 
were to report to the organization names of successful bidders and guarantors every months and 
those of any who failed to pay installments if that happened (Article 23) 
37) Most of the tanomoshi funds of the time in Los Angeles were utilized for hotels which were, 
then, one of the most prosperous businesses. 
38) Japanese Chamber of Commerce, JajJa11ese-Amcrica11 Tm dθ Year/Joo/< 1919-20, p. 18; Nanka 
Nihonjinkai，“NewspapeτClippings，” undated, 1922. JARP Collection, UCLA. 
39) Rafu Shim戸o,7 October 1914 
40) Japanθsc-American News, 20 Fet〕1・uary 1930. 
41) Although modern banks and credit unions were established and ＼九1ereexpanding operations, the 
former was of no help to the ordinary people and the latter was not functioning well. Thus the 
centuries old tradition of tanomoshi persisted among the general public as thei1・majorfinancial sys-
tern. In 1915・＇Mujingyo Act”was promulgated to contr・olmujin companies improving the quality 
as well as the methods of business. 'I、hereexisted 136 mujin companies in 1916 in Japan, while as 
of the end of 1937 there were 246 with a capitalization of 36,849,000 yen. After ＼へ＇orld＼へrarI some 
of them were reorganized into Sogo Cin!w (mutual bank). Zenkoku Mujin Shukaijo (1938): Zen!wlm 
Mu.Jin Jζaisha Yoran, Tokyo 
42) Nanka Nikkeijin Shogyo Kaigisho, op. cit., footnote 25, p. 128. 
43) Nan!w Niho11Jin Nenlwn 1, 1917-18, p. 63. 
44) Sakae Kaihara (1916): Kashu Hiroshima Kenjin Hotlenshi, Sacramento, 43-60; Junnichi Takeda 
(1929): Zaibei Hiroshima Kenjinshi, Los Angeles, 119-123. 
45) Tsunegoro Hirose 1931) : Zaibei Fu!woたaKenjinshi, Los Angeles, 73 107. 
46〕 NoritakaYagasaki (1984) : Ethnicity in Immigrants’Farming: a Study of Japanese Floriculture iη 
the San Francisco Bay-Monterey Bay Region, California, Science Reports of the Institute o.f Geosci-
ence, The University of Tsulwba. Section A 5, 91 136. 
47) The annual dues of “financial members円 were$25, of "social members" two dollars. Fumiko Fuku-
oka (1937): !v1utual Life and Aid Among the Japanese in Southern California with Special Eeference 
to Los Angeles, iV1. S. thesis, University of Sou them California, p. 32. 
48) ibid. 
49) Nanka Nikkeijin Shogyo Kaigisho, op. cit., footnote 16, 172 173. 
50) ibid., p. 174 
51) ibid.' 173 176. 
52) Nichibei Times (1971）：入lichi/Jeijiji jusho Rolw, San Francisco. 
